From Screwdrivers to State Power, The Story the New York Times Chose to Tell -

Last Updated on 5 February 2026

Why mocking a researcher distracts from Nigeria uncounted dead

Editor’s Note:
This article critiques journalistic framing and narrative emphasis in a New York Times report. It does not endorse the claims, figures, or rhetoric of any individual or organisation mentioned. The focus is on media analysis and public interest debate.

When Western media covers Nigeria, the question is rarely what is happening.
The real question is who is allowed to speak.

The New York Times recent article on Nigeria insecurity answers that question clearly and uncomfortably.

A Story More Interested in a Man Than in a Crisis:

Original headline by The New York Times: The Screwdriver Salesman Behind Trump’s Airstrikes in Nigeria

The New York Times recently published a feature portraying Emeka Umeagbalasi, a Nigerian civil society researcher, as an unlikely and unreliable figure whose work has allegedly distorted United States policy on Nigeria. The article is polished, dramatic, and confident. It is also deeply flawed.

This is not a defence of Emeka Umeagbalasi figures.
It is a challenge to the journalistic framing, selective scepticism, and narrative shortcuts that define the piece.

From the opening paragraphs, the focus drifts quickly from Nigeria insecurity to the man himself. His height. His screwdriver shop. His earbud. His living room. His bookshelf. These details are not accidental. They function as narrative cues, subtly inviting the reader to doubt credibility based on class and presentation rather than evidence.

Whether a man sells screwdrivers or works from a Washington think tank has no bearing on whether Nigeria dead are being counted accurately.

That point should not need defending. Yet the article insists on making it central.

Selective Scepticism Activists on Trial the State Untouched

The article rigorously interrogates Umeagbalasi methodology. That scrutiny is legitimate. It is also one sided.

The same scepticism is not applied to the Nigerian government, which:

Publishes no comprehensive national casualty figures
Does not disaggregate victims by religion
Lacks transparent and publicly accessible death registries
Admits that many attacks, especially in rural areas, go unrecorded

In global conflict indices, Nigeria consistently ranks among the world deadliest countries. Yet official government figures frequently diverge, sometimes by hundreds or thousands of deaths, from independent trackers such as civil society databases and international monitoring projects.

This discrepancy is not incidental. It is structural. And it raises a question the article never confronts.

If the state does not count its dead, who is allowed to try?

Everyone Is a Victim Is Not an Analysis

The article repeatedly emphasises that both Christians and Muslims suffer from insecurity in Nigeria. This is true. It is also insufficient.

Generalised violence does not erase targeted violence.
A weak state can fail everyone while extremists still single out specific communities.

Patterns matter. Timing matters. Targets matter.

Attacks on churches, clergy kidnappings, religious rhetoric used by perpetrators, and the destruction of worship centres are not dismissed simply because insecurity is widespread. To argue otherwise is to flatten reality into abstraction.

Balance is not achieved by blurring distinctions. It is achieved by examining them.

Using ACLED for What It Was Never Designed to Do

To challenge Umeagbalasi figures, the article relies heavily on data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, commonly known as ACLED. Yet it acknowledges that ACLED:

Does not disaggregate victims by religion
Includes combatants, insurgents, and civilians in aggregate counts
Relies on reported incidents which are known to be incomplete in remote or inaccessible areas

What the article does not emphasise is that ACLED itself repeatedly warns users about these exact limitations, especially in complex conflict zones like Nigeria.

Using a dataset that explicitly states it cannot measure religious targeting to dismiss claims about religious targeting is not rigorous analysis. It is a category error.

If a tool was not built to answer a question, it should not be used to close the debate.

Condemning Assumptions Except When They Are Convenient

Umeagbalasi is criticised for assuming victims’ religious identity based on geography. That criticism may be fair.

But the article makes its own assumptions.

It assumes official statements are inherently accurate.
It assumes government denial outweighs local testimony.
It assumes religious motives are more likely exaggerated than underreported.

Assumptions are treated as disqualifying when made by activists and acceptable when made by state actors.

That is not neutrality. That is narrative alignment.

Turning a Data Debate Into a Moral Distraction

Rather than staying focused on methodology, the article pivots into moral judgement, particularly around Umeagbalasi rhetoric about Fulani militias.

Condemning ethnic hate speech is necessary and correct.

But conflating that condemnation with dismissing all discussion of Fulani identified armed groups is intellectually evasive.

Multiple researchers, journalists, and conflict analysts acknowledge that some violent groups self-identify as Fulani and operate within specific herder farmer and communal conflict dynamics. Naming that reality is not the same as endorsing ethnic hatred.

The article collapses this distinction, replacing analysis with moral spectacle.

The Implausible Myth of One Man Who Shaped United States Policy

Perhaps the most sensational and least credible framing is the suggestion that a single Nigerian activist shaped United States military action.

The United States maintains a multibillion pound intelligence apparatus.
The State Department, Pentagon, CIA, and NSA do not outsource foreign policy decisions to Google searches from Onitsha.

To suggest otherwise does not merely exaggerate an activist influence. It insults the intelligence capacity of the United States government in order to heighten the drama of the story.

This framing serves one purpose only. To turn a complex geopolitical decision into a morality tale with a convenient villain.

Mockery Is Not a Rebuttal

Repeated references to Googled it, laptop theatrics, award plaques, and staged irony are not evidence.

They are narrative signals designed to guide the reader towards contempt rather than understanding.

If the data is wrong, disprove it with better data. If the methodology is weak, present a stronger one. Mockery replaces rebuttal when rebuttal is harder.

The Story That Should Have Been Told

The real scandal is not that a civil society researcher relies on secondary sources.

The real scandal is that Africa most populous nation does not systematically count its dead.

Until Nigeria builds transparent, verifiable, and publicly accessible casualty data systems, imperfect actors will continue to fill the vacuum.

The New York Times chose to ridicule the symptom instead of interrogating the cause.

Who Gets to Count Nigerian Deaths

At its core, the article answers an unspoken question.

Who is allowed to speak with authority about Nigerian suffering?

Not local activists.
Not imperfect non government organisations.
Not voices outside Western validation structures.

Only institutions already deemed respectable by global power centres.

That is not journalism in service of truth. It is journalism policing credibility.

Final Word from NaijaDazz

Emeka Umeagbalasi may be wrong in some of his numbers.
His methods may be flawed. His rhetoric may deserve criticism.

But none of that justifies a narrative built on ridicule, selective scepticism, and convenient simplifications.

When the state refuses to count its dead, those who try, however imperfectly, should be challenged rigorously, not humiliated theatrically.

Nigeria crisis deserves better. And so does journalism.

From Screwdrivers to State Power, The Story the New York Times Chose to Tell